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he theory of evolution is a remarkable scientific
accomplishment. The empirical evidence behind
the theory is overwhelming. The fact of evolution,
that the present species of organisms have come
into being over millions of years as a result of gradual
changes, is difficult, if not impossible, to gainsay. The the
ory has been confirmed by the combined efforts of scientists
all over the world. The theory is so well tested that those
people who criticize it are usually dismissed as Bible
beating religious fanatics, or as unscientific, ignorant, stu
pid and insane - maybe even wicked. Harvard biologist Dr.
Ernst Mayr, an expert on evolution, goes so far as to say
that those people who do not believe in the truth of evolu
tion have not received a good education, and the number of
unbelievers "casts a lot of poor light on American educa
tion." l Today, a robust and refined version of Darwin's the
ory of evolution (neo-Darwinism) takes pride of place in
science and philosophy classrooms in America. On the
whole, the controversy between science and religion is over
and done with. Theology is no longer threatened by the
theory of evolution or scared of science finding out truths
of the world.
Nevertheless, the so-called Creation scientists con
tinue to argue against the theory of evolution. In good Dar
winian fashion, the Creation scientists have had to craft bet
ter arguments in order to survive. A new species of Crea
tionists has appeared-the neo-Creationists (neo-creos).
They claim that mere evolution is false because there are
signs of extra-natural (intelligent) forces at play. They argue
that design exists in nature that is not a product of natural
processes. What distinguishes the new creationists from the
old creationists is that they have learned that the only ap
proach to the question of origins and evolution is the scien
tific approach. As a result of more than a century of relent
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less accusations of being unscientific and religious, along
with failed attempts to push their view in the courtroom,
the neo-creos have focused their efforts at unseating the
philosophical. assumptions of science. They admit that the
fossil and molecular data in particular, and the empirical
data in general, support the theory of evolution, but they
do not admit defeat.
Their new tactic is to turn the tables on the scientific
method. They claim that they are not practicing pseudo
science, but rather that it is the Darwinists who are endan
gering scientific scholarship. The scientific method, they
claim, must not rule out the possibility
detecting further
reality beyond the causal order of nature. Their main argu
ment which is not new but has come back with renewed
vigor - is that the naturalistic interpretation of the Descent
of Life is not science, but a philosophical worldview. If
methodological naturalism is expunged from science, as the
Creationist reasoning goes, then pure scientific light shall
be free to shine on the world as it is, in all of God's glory.
In this paper, I shall argue that naturalism is not a
philosophical bias, but an essential foundation of science.
The first section of this paper explicates the neo-creo argu
ment against naturalism. The second section is a defense of
naturalism against anti- or super-naturalism. The third sec
tion is a critique of arguments from design. We shall see
why the approach of the neo-creos is unscientific, and that
the exclusion of super-naturalism from an explanation of
origins is warranted and desirable on both philosophical
and scientific grounds.
I. NATURALISM AND ITS CREATION CRITICS

The theory of evolution is usually taken to include
Darwin and Wallace IS idea of natural selection as the cen
tral mechanism of evolution. The theory says that all organ
isms originated from an undirected, natural, law-bound
process of generation, development, mutation and natural
selection - what Darwin called "survival of the fittest. II
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While the details of evolution are complex, a key part of the
theory is that evolution happens without any purposeful
input - no Creator, no Intelligent Designer. According to
Darwin, nature is self-contained; chance and nature deter
mine everything.
Few would deny that organisms have changed over
time. The Creationist case against naturalistic evolution is
almost exclusively focused on arguing that the theory of
evolution is on its own terms a failure. Neo-Creationists op
pose the theory that lithe full panoply of life has evolved
through purposeless naturalistic processes. 1I2 The neo-creos
point to many mysteries of biology, like the unknown ori
gin of life, sexuality and the genetic code, to argue against
the theory of evolution. However, the argument I am pri
marily interested in for the present purposes is the argu
ment attributed to professor of law and father of neo
Creationism, Phillip E. Johnson, 'who says that Darwinism
is not so much a scientific theory, but a philosophical enter
prise whose goal is to explain the world in a strictly natu
ralistic way that forecloses any role for a Creator or Intelli
gent Designer. Johnson has made his name by arguing that
what has been sold to us in the authoritative name of sci
ence is actually a philosophical understanding of reality. As
long as we take the fWldam.ental assumption of Darwinism
for granted - that naturalistic processes can explain every
thing - Darwinism, he claims, becomes an absolute theory,
seen as necessarily true, because the alternative, Intelligent
Design, is automatically vetoed. Therefore, in Johnson's
words, 'The first step for a twenty-first century science of
origins is to separate materialist philosophy from empirical
science. 1I3 This means that at the end of the day, scientists
are supposed to come back from the field and look at what
the evidence shows without a materialist bias and ask if
natural forces explain what they see. For example, an an..,
thropologist is supposed to ask herself:
Does the fossil record fit when you look at it objec
tively and without a Darwinian bias? We know the
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answer to that is no. We ask, 'Does finch beak
variation really show how you can get finches in
the first place?" No, of course not. Neo-Darwinism
is a failed project - give it up! "Not yet!" you say.
"We're still trying to succeed."4
The anatomy of the problem, according to the neD-creos is,
in short, that empirical science has become confused and
cmlflated with materialist or naturalist philosophy, creating
a conflict of interest. Evolutionary scientists, Johnson ar
gues, have an obligation lito separate materialist philosophy
from scientific investigation"5 and to accept what biologists
know as biologists and what archeologists know as arche
ologists, but not their claims about philosophical issues like
naturalism. Johnson appeals to the tide of history by point
ing out that lIone by one the great prophets of materialism
have been shown to be false prophets and have fallen aside.
Marx and Freud have lost their scientific standing. Now
Darwin is on the block."6
Johnson'S argument was evidently so convincing,
that historian and philosopher Michael Ruse - the philoso
pher who in 1981 testified in an Arkansas courtroon1 that
creation science has none of the essential features of science
and is actually dogmatic religious fundmnentalism 
changed his opinion on the matter after being asked to
comment on Johnson1s book Darwin on Trial. Ruse, speak
ing at a 1993 Annual Meeting of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science, said:
Alld it seems to me very clear that at some very ba
sic level, evolution as a scientific theory makes a
commitment to a kind of naturalism, namely, that
.at some level one is going to exclude miracles and
these sorts of things, come what may. Now, you
might say, does this mean it's just a religious as
sumption, does this mean it's irrational to do some
thing like this. I would argue very strongly that it's
not. At a certain pragmatic level, the proof of the
pudding is in the eating. And that if certain things
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do work, you keep going with this, and that you
donlt change in midstream, and so on and so forth.
I think that one can in fact defend a scientific and
naturalistic approach, even if one recognizes that
this does include a metaphysical assumption to the
regularity of nature, or something of this nature ...

evolution, akin to religion, involves making certain a
priori or metaphysical assumptions, which at some level
cannot be proven empirically?
In these words, Ruse is confessing that he has recently come
to realize that the theory of evolution is based on unproven
philosophical assumptions. Assuring the audience that he
is "no less of an evolutionist now than I ever was,l! Ruse
went on to say that "an evolutionist, is metaphysically
based at some level, just as much as ... some creationist .. .!
must say that live been coming to this kind of position my
self." B Ruse in the early 1980s was of the clear-cut opinion
that evolutionism is science and creationism is not. "Now,"
he says, "I'm starting to feeL ..that we should move our de
bate now onto another level. .. l think that we should recog
nize, both historically and perhaps philosophically, cel'-.
tainly that the science side has certain metaphysical as
sumptions built into doing science ... 119
It
obvious that Johl1son 's interest in framing the
problem in terms of naturalism versus empirical science
leaves the door open to the possibility of scientific evidence
for design by refuting the naturalist worldview and its con
sequences. The logic of this strategy is to agree with the
evolutionists that science, not philosophy or theology, is the
only way to detect intelligent design and intelligent causes,
and then to claim that the only epistemically acceptable sci
ence is that which is unencumbered by naturalistic philoso
phy. An acceptable science, suggests creationist William
Dembski, is one that rejects "methodological naturalism."IO
This type of call to weed the naturalistic philosophical bias
(methodological naturalism) out of the biological sciences is
not new. Creationist Duane T. Gish in 1973 says that he:
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Strongly suspects that the dogmatic acceptance of
evolution is not due, primarily, to the nature of the
evidence but the philosophic bias peculiar to our
times .... That this is the philosophy held by most
biologists has been recently emphasized by
Dobzhansky. In his review of Monod's book Chance
and Necessity Dobzhansky (1972) says, IlHe has
stated with admirable clarity, and eloquence often
verging on pathos, the mechanistic materialist phi
losophy shared by most of the present
'establishment' in the biological sciences)1

In sum, neo-Creationists believe that many aspects
of life are too complex to be explained except by reference
to an intelligent designer, God. They say that scientists have
overlooked evidence of design in nature because of a natu
ralist philosophical bias. Supporters of this view argue that
evolutionary science is thus more metaphysical than an em
pirical undertaking, because naturalists are necessarily evo
lutionists and therefore not open to other explanations. In
the follownlg sections, we shall see that this is not entn'ely
true. Science does rely on methodological naturalism the
study of matter, energy, and their interaction - in seeking
logical explanations and empirical evidence for natural
phenomena. However, the theory of evolution is not merely
a philosophical worldview. Nor does it have an opinion on
the intervention of supernatural powers in the natural
world, except that there is no testable way to use this as an
operative explanation.

II. TAKING NATURALISM SERIOUSLY

Framing the problem as one between philosophy
and science is at best playing cat and mouse with the issue,
and at worst unproductive, because it relies on a mistaken
division. Taking science out of empirical philosophy is ob
viously a bad idea. In the words of John Dewey, "For ac
cording to empirical philosophy, science provides the only
means we have for learning about man and. the world in
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which he lives. 1I12 EmpiTical materialist philosophy has no
quarrel with science, and neither do the nea-creos. What
they want to do is take the philosophy out of empirical evo
lutionary science to arrive at a science that is free from pre
supposition, or at least those presuppositions that they do
not like. They have supposed that since science is supreme
in the field of knowledge, philosophy is therefore unneces
sary and should not contaminate science.
First, I must say that these comments lack any in
sight into the nature of science. In the words of Max Weber
in an essay titled "Science as a Vocation/ "No science is ab
solutely free from presuppositions, and no science can
prove its fundamental value to the man who rejects these
presuppositions. lIl3 For instance, he notes that "All scien
tific work presupposes that the rules of logic and method
are valid.1!14 In addition, all scientific work also presupposes
naturalism, conceived as the absence of supernatural inter
vention. Ronald N. Giere defines naturalism as follows:
Ontologically, naturalism hnplies the rejection of
supernaturalism. Traditionally this has meant pri~
madly the rejection of any deity, such as the Jlldco~
Christian God, which stands outside nature as crea~
tor or actor. Positively, naturalists hold that reality,
including human life and society, is exhausted by
what exists in the causal order of nature. 15

Naturalism is indeed a philosophical worldview, empirical
in method, that regards everything that exists or occurs as
belonging to one all-encompassing system of nature, how
ever intelligent, spiritual or purposeful nature may appear.
TIle all-encompassing part of naturalism serves mainly
negative purposes. It rejects supel1latural things and expla
nations and Cartesian dualisms that can make the existence
of the external world a matter of doubt or of God's wilL It
also rejects arguments from ignorance. Lack of knowledge
about something never provides sufficient reason for alleg
ing a non-natural explanation. Moreover, naturalism is not
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concerned to disprove the existence of God. "Until and
uIuess the existence of God is shown by empirical evi
dence," writes Sterling P. Lamprecht in The Metaphysics oj
Naturalism, lIit is not an article by which human values and
human ideals may be significantly determined or advanced
or enforced."16
It is the task of Philosophy to describe what we have
to assume in order to do science, namely, that nature is uni
form, self-contained and law-bound. Science must presup
pose naturalism for many reasons. For starters, the empiri
cal nature of science must eliminate supernatural interven
tions as causal factors. The word science," almost by defi
nition
II

means that principally there are no mysterious in
calculable forces that corne into play, but rather
that one can, in principle, master all things by cal
culation. This means that the world is disen
chanted. One need no longer have recourse to
magical means in order to master or implore the
spirits, as did the savage, for whom such mysteri
ous powers existedP

Given this worldview, the naturalist is someone who neces
sarily respects the conclusions of natural science. Both natu
ralism and the scientific method belong together in theory
as they exist together in fact.
Pragmatism is another reason that science presup
poses naturalism. John Dewey, who grounded his philoso
phy in Darwin's philosophical and biological naturalism,
writes that liThe naturalist...sees how anti-naturalism has
operated to prevent the application of scientific methods in
the whole field of human and social subject matter.l1lH
Dewey's defense of natmalism is pragmatic - naturalism is
pragmatic, anti-naturalism is not. He argues that anti
naturalism tends to discount the actual resources available
for the betterment of humanity. The outcome of science un
der the "handicap" of anti-natmalism is the systematic dis
regard by anti-naturalists (neo-creos) of scientific method
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and its consequences.19 The anti-naturalism of the neo-creos
tends to "dull their sense of the importance of evidence, to
blunt their sensitivity to the need of accuracy of statement,
to encourage emotional rhetoric at the expense of analysis
and discrimination."2o
Furthermore, the impossibility of a scientific anti
naturalism is made explicit by Dewey. For IIIf they [anti
naturalists] presented the naturalistic position in its own
terms, they would have to take serious account of scientific
method and its conclusions. But if they should do that, they
would inevitably be imbued with some of the ideas of the·
very philosophy they are attacking."21 Dewey is striking a
Humean note here by pointing out that arguments against
naturalism are self-defeating. Hume's lesson in An Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding is that arguments from
experience (induction) cannot prove that nature is uniform
since these arguments are founded on the supposition of
that uniformity. In other words, to decry science for sup
posing as its foundation the view that principally only cal
culable, na~ural forces exist, is to demand that science prove
what it cannot logically prove, namely, the foundational
principle by which science is possible.
III. CRITIQUE OF ARGUMENTS FROM DESIGN

Intelligent Design is, in part, an argument from anal
ogy. Creation science is alleged to be analogous to what ar
cheologists do when they come across a piece of stone. Cer
tain shapes of stones and patterns knapped on them indi
cate the intelligent work of prehistoric man. Archeologists
infer from an arrowhead or shard of pottery that it was
made by some prehistoric person, and not by wind, water
or any other natural force. Indeed, intelligent design is
something we encounter every day. Entire vocations, like
archeology, anthropology, cryptography, even insurance
fraud investigation and the criminal justice system, exist on
the basis of discriminating design from accident. We com
monly recognize design in objects or events that are just too
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improbable to have occurred by chance.
Where the Creation scientists fall into error is in ex
trapolating this analogy to the world as a whole. It is one
thing for humans to be able to detect design within the
world they inhabit and construct. It is quite another for hu
mans to detect design in the very 111.akeup of the world itself.
Detecting design as a result of supernatural forces is not
analogous to detecting design as a result of natural forces.
We know how human beings design things and what these
things look like, but we do not know how God designs
things and what these things would look like. Hume makes
this point in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Since
all om' knowledge comes from experience, we can go from
causes to effects, but only insofar as they are specific causes
and effects within the world. Hume says that we have no
idea what it means to say that the whole world is itself an
effect, and therefore we cannot go from this premise - that
the world as a whole is an effect - to some alleged cause
that lies beyond or behind the world.22
Design reflects more of the maIU1er in which neo
creos approach the world than of the manner in which the
world, independent of the human mind, is constituted.
Neo-Creationists say that they should be taken seriously
because they do not presuppose anything about the world,
unlike Darwinists, who view the world through the phi
losophical lens of naturalism. I need only appeal to Ruse
and Weber to point up the flaw in their thinking - no
worldview is free of philosophical presuppositions. Crea
tionists proceed from the presupposition that "works of
God exist," and then ask IIHow is their existence detectable
in the struggle of life?" Neo-Darwinists, on the other hand,
presuppose that God is absent and unnecessary. They pro
ceed from the presupposition that "nature is all there iS,ll
and then ask, "How are favored organisms preserved in the
struggle for life?" No matter how strong a will, neo
Creationism necessarily presupposes the possibility that
God is not absent in the struggle of life and thus nature is
not uniform or self-contained - even though this is not how

WHAT IS "NATURAL" ABOUT NATURAL SCIENCE?

neo-creos would see their methodology. This is all one with
saying that apart from philosophical super-naturalism or
theism or something of the sort creationism is absurd and
meaningless. According to Johnson's standards of scientific
acceptability, then, neo-Creationism should not be taken
seriously because it presupposes that design exists in na
ture.
Arguments from design are also based on Cartesian
reasoning. Descartes argues in the Meditations that an effect
carmot contain more perfection than its cause. This argu
ment translates into the proposition that any design is an
effect or manifestation of an intelligent cause, a mind. Neo
Creationists see design in nature and infer causality by
something with intelligence. This inference, however, is du
bious. When Creationists purport, to see design or
"information-rich structures of biologi'23 in nature, there is
no process of reasoning that can secure them against the
contrary supposition that the design they perceive is not
really out there in nature, existing even when unperceived,
but rather imposed on nature from without. What a Crea
tionist takes to be a sign of intelligent design, the naturalist
sees only a product of. nature. John Rowland makes this
same point by quoting Voltaire,
who said that it was obvious that the nose was de
signed to bear spectacles, because it fitted them so
well. In other words, the evolutionists say that the
person who sees some sense of design in the eye or
the ear or any other organ of the living creature,
sees it because he himself puts it there. 24
In short, design is not a basic h'ait of nature but an illusion
which nature easily arouses in human beings.
Finally, a consequence of the different philosophical
foundations of the theory of evolution on the one hand, and
of creation science on the other, is that a scientist cam10t
have an honest conversation with a creationist. What each
has to say has no persuasive meaning for the other insofar
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as they are not vdlling to question the most basic presuppo
sitions of their respective positions. This is why the contro
\'ersv and debate between nee-Creationists and nee
Darwinists will in all likelihood never be resolved. A Dar
winist calIDot approve or go along "with those lv-hose beliefs
"weaken dependence upon the scientific method, As much
as Phillip Johnson might argue otherwise, the sacred and
supernatural dimension of life witnessed by neo
Creationists simply cannot be seen from the perspective of
the scientific attitude.
In conclusion, arguing that evolutionary science is
merely a philosophy is utter nonsense. The attempt to sepa
rate scientific claims from philosophical claims is na'ive be
cause science has to make philosophical assumptions in or
der to 'work, as do we in order to live an orderly life. The
philosophical assumptions of science are neither ilTational
nor prejudiciaL Rather, naturalistic assumptions and expla
nations are necessary for doing science. In other words, phi
losophy is what makes science as a vocation possible and
its applications useful and meaningful (pragmatic). We can
not believe the nee-creos when they maintain that they
have observed the data objectively, that evolution cannot
explain what they observe, and that, therefore, a supernatu
ral intelligent designer is involved by default. Creation sci
ence and the theory of evolution both presuppose philoso
phical, methodological, and metaphysical views. The differ
ence is that the presuppositions of the theory of evolution
are continuous with science, while those of Creation science
are not.
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